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IN Tl-IE SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
H. ALEEN BAKER,

-vs-

Petitioner,

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF UTAH, W. L. YOUNG
BROKERAGE COMPANY and
the STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Respondents.

Case No. 10288

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The petitioner H. Aleen Baker has sought review by
certiorari from a decision of the Industrial Commission
denying her compensation pursuant to her claim for injuries
allegedly sustained during the course of her employment.
DISPOSITION BELOW
On August 9, 1964, the petitioner applied for a hearing
upon her claim for workmen's compensation (R. 5). She
allfged that on the 8th of May, 1964, while filing papers,
~he sustained a ruptured disc (R. 5). On October 19, 1964,
a hearing was held upon the application before the Industriai Commission's referee ( R. 8). Subsequently, on the
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25th of November, 1964, the Industrial Commission entered its order finding that the petitioner's claimed ailmem
was not caused by an accident arising out of the course of
her employment (R. 34). On December 6, 1964, a petition for rehearing was filed, and on December 9, 1964 it
'
was denied (R. 35, 36).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent Industrial Commission submits the court
should sustain its order denying the petitioner workmen's
compensation coverage. It should be noted that neither the
employer nor the State Insurance Fund, who was the insurance carrier, has been served in this appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent accepts the petitioner's Statement of
Facts as set out in her brief, except that the respondent ,
desires to call to the court's attention the following facts
concerning the alleged injury.
Petitioner testified on cross-examination at the time of
the hearing before the Industrial Commission ( R. 18) :

"Q. Now I take it that you do not know exactly what '
caused this problem with your back?
"A. No, I don't. Except that it occurred while I was
filing in the office. And I hadn't done anything out of
the ordinary either at home or at work, or after work.
to have caused it. Very definitely."
On the day of the alleged injury she did not call the
matter to her employer's attention and spent the week-end
at home without consulting a physician ( R. 20). Thereafter she returned to work the Monday following the Frida)
when the alleged accident was supposed to have occurred

..
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and worked that day without informing her employer of
the alleged injury. Not until the following day did she
mention to her employer that she was suffering any back
pain. She testified: "I believe I told Mr. Douglas Smith."
( R. 12.) She further testified that she believed she told him
the Tuesday following the alleged accident. The petitioner
had changed residences and moved personal belongings
approximately one month prior to the accident (R. 17).
There was no evidence offered of any slip, fall or unusual
exertion ( R. 34) . Based on the above, the Commission
ruled that the ruptured disc was not the result of any activity of the petitioner's employment.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE co:MMISSION WAS NOT OBLIGED TO BELIEVE THE
PETITIONER'S STATEMENT AS TO THE ALLEGED IN}UJ{ Y AND THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUBSTANTIATE THE COMMISSION'S REJECTION OF THE
PETITIONER'S CLAIM.

It is well settled that this court on review of the order of
the Industrial Commission will not interfere with the findings of the Commission unless the findings are without reasonable basis and unsupported by substantial evidence.
Freuhauf Trailer Co. v. Industrial Commission, 16 Utah
2d 95, 396 P.2d 409 ( 1964). In order for the petitioner to
prevail in the instant case, this court must find that the
Industrial Commission acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and
unreasonably refused to consider evidence which would
have justified an award. Kent v. Industrial Commission,
89 Utah 381, 57 P.2d 724 ( 1936).
In the instant case the evidence is obviously sufficient
to sustain the findings of the Industrial Commission. The

4

evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the
Commission's determination, discloses that the petitioner
was not engaging in any unusual exertion or heavy activity
when the alleged accident occurred. By her own testimony
she was uncertain as to just when and how the alleged injury occurred. She was engaged in routine office activities
which, under normal circumstances, would be unlikely to '
result in the injury complained of. By her own admissions,
she returned to work following the day in which she felt
the injury occurred, and did not report the matter to her
employer. Further, she did not seek medical attention over
the week-end. The petitioner's statements to other persons
show that there is doubt in her mind as to when and how '
the accident occurred. Thus, she told Helen Morris that
she "guessed" that she hurt her back filing ( R. 24). She
also indicated to Phyllis Wright that she was uncertain as
to how the injury occurred. Miss Wright testified that the
petitioner stated: "I hurt my back at work, I guess."
( R. 26.) She did not disclose to Phyllis Larsen how she
hurt her back ( R. 28), and told Beverly Cudney that she
"thought" she hurt her back while filing. It is apparent,
therefore, that the petitioner retained a good deal of uncertainty in her own mind as to just how and when the accident occurred.
In Smith v. Industrial Commission, 104 Utah 318, 140
P.2d 394 ( 1943), this court observed that in workmen's
compensation cases the award must be based on facts found
from the evidence and not "mere possibility." The court in
that case in similar circumstances found it within the prov·
ince of the Commission to deny the award.
In Holland v. Industrial Commission, 5 Utah 2d 105,
297 P.2d 230 ( 1956) the petitioner contended that he sus·
tained a ruptured disc from an industrial accident. In that

th(' 1Tidcncc of the petitioner's actual involvement was
,ub,t.u1tially greater than in the instant case, since the foreman actually observed the alleged accident. This court held
that the actions of the Industrial Commission in denying
rccO\'ery wne not arbitrary and capricious, and that the
Commission was not obliged to believe the claimant's uncorroborated testimony. This case is similar in circumstance
since the petitioner here did not notify her employer of the
alleged injury until several clays after its occurrence and
resumed work during the interim. Further, her statements to other persons show that she entertained doubt as
to the actual cause of the pain in her back. Also, approximately one month prior to the alleged incident she had been
involved in the process of moving her residence, which must
ha\'e entailed some physical activity. Thus, the Holland
case supports the Commission's action in this case. There
was no "identifiable accident" which the Commission could
say caused the injury. Pintar v. Industrial Commission, 14
Utah 2d 276, 382 P.2d 414 ( 1963).
In Allen v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company, 184
Kan, 184, 334 P.2d 370, the petitioner, seeking affirmation
of the Industrial Commission's award which had been set
asic~e by the trial court, claimed that he sustained an injury
to his back which was in the nature of a kink or pain while
he was on the job as he was talking to his foreman. The
Kansas Supreme Court noted that the question of the
credrnce of the witnesses was for the triers of fact and that
the trial court's determination that the injury did not arise
out of the employment should be sustained.
It is submitted that there is sufficient precedent in this
State' and in other jurisdictions to sustain the Commission's
cktf'rmination that an award in this case was not justified.
,-; 1, 1
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CONCLUSION
The facts before the Commission in this case do not
demonstrate clearly that the petitioner sustained an injury
as a result of her employment. Indeed, this court in Maim.
strom v. Olson~ 10110, 19 March 1965 (Ut. Sup. Ct.) most
recently acknowledged that a ruptured disc is usually an
unusual occurrence resulting from a violent act. The ab.
sence of any unusual activity, the delay of the petitioner in
reporting the incident, and her own incredulity lends support to the Commission's determination that the injury did
not result from the petitioner's employment. This court
should affirm.
Respectfully submitted,

PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General
RONALD N. BOYCE
Chief Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

